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THE IMPLIED OBLIGATION OF AN EMPLOYEE
JOHN E. HANNIGAN
"This right of the employ6 to use his abilities, developed
through his experiences, to the utmost of his capacity, . . and
his obligation to preserve to the full the property rights of his
employer are shaded into each other by lines so fine that it is
doubtful whether anything but a nice sense of honor can keep
them distinguished," said judge Dicidnson. 1 Does he mean that
a court, passing upon these twilight questions, may need a moral
light to guide, in addition to that of legal science? Nothing
should be clearer to the judicial understanding than a legal ab-
straction, nor less difficult for the intelligent layman than a spe-
cific point of personal honor. The American courts are in con-
fusion, apparently, as to the ethical application of the rules to
facts.
There are certain plain rules, applicable to these situations.
The employee's right to lawful freedom is not to be covenanted
away for his employer's benefit,2 nor a debtor's for the benefit
of a creditor.3 On the other hand, the employer's rights will be
protected from a servant's, or ex-servant's, breach of that con-
fidence which was incidental to the employment relation.4 Every
covenant running to an employer, restricting the post-relation
freedom of an employee, is prima fade unlawful, but the pre-
sumption disappears when the covenant is shown to be reason-
ably necessary for the employer's protection,
The express contract of the vendor of a going business, not
to engage in the same line as that of the business which he has
sold, will not be enforced. Anti-competition agreements per se
are invalid. The vendor's express or implied contract not to
'DuPont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland, 216 Fed. 271, 272 (E. D.
Pa. 1914).2 Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, [i96] i A. C. 688.
'Horwood v. Millar's Timber & Trading Ca., [1917] i K. B. 305.
'Robb v. Green, [1895] : Q. B. i.
5Attwood v. Lamont, [I9i2o 3 K B. 571.
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compete for the custom of the concern whose good will he has
sold will be enforced only so far and so long as may be reason-
ably necessary for the protection of the property purchased;
there may be no derogation from a grant, but enforcement will
go no further than protection of a grant, because beyond that
line is protected freedom.
An employee's express contract not to engage hereafter in
the same line of business as that of his present employer will not
be enforced, for it is an obligation in restraint of free trade.
However, as an English writer recently expressed it, such a con-
tract will be enforced if it meets three conditions:
"i. There must be in connexion with the particular em-
ployment such trade secrets as require protection;
"2. The risk of disclosure of such secrets must be so
real as to necessitate for the protection of the employer a
covenant in restraint of trade; and
"3. Assuming that both of the last two conditions are
satisfied, the restraint must be not wider than is necessary
for the protection of the employer." '
The laissez-faire attitude of the courts towards a provision
for liquidated damages is not taken towards an express agree-
ment between a master and servant, as to what is reasonably
necessary for the master's post-relation protection. Upon find-
ing the basic fact of confidential relations, they will raise a pre-
sumption favorable to the express agreement, but not beyond
what may be ample protection to the employer's confidential
.ight.J
The problems of implied or express contractual protection
of a going business from the competition of the vendor were clar-
ified by Lord Macnaghten in the Nordenfeldt case." The same
objective legal certainty, however, does not prevail in cases in-
volving the implied obligations of post-service employees. "Em-
'Fanvell, Coveimnts i& Restraint of Trade =s between Employer and Ei-
ployee, (1928) 44 L. Q. Ra,. 66, 67.
7Edgecomb v. Edmondston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926).
a [1893] z Ch. 6s, [1894] A. C. 535; SANDERsoN, RFSTRAiNT OF TRADE:
(I926) ; Carpenter, Validity of Contracts Not to Compete, (1928) 76 U. op PA.
L. REv. 24; note (1928) i Ht v. L. Rnv. 782.
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ployee" is not here used as meaning exclusively a clerk, servant
or manager. It may include an independent contractor, or . per-
son with whom the plaintiff has had no relations at all.
What rights, according to the decisions, has an employer
against the harmful activities of a former employee, in the ab-
sence of an express covenant? What business or intangible prop-
erty interests may not be impaired with impunity by one who is,
or has been, rightfully dealing with that business or interest?
Perhaps essentially the same question arises in this form: What
confidential relations will turn the court's presumption in favor
of a covenant against freedom, if a covenant had been made?
It is unquestioned that an ex-employee may compete generally
for the customers of his employer who form part of the general
or open trade market, -with whose needs he became acquainted
through his employment. 10 He may compete in spite of his cov-
enant not to compete, and he is privileged to exploit for his own
advantage or a new employer's advantage, to the old employer's
detriment, the knowledge, acquired in the old employer's service,
of the rules, ways and customs of the market, the methods of
obtaining business, the sources of supply and forces of demand,
and the factors affecting the general trade or industry. "Equity
has no power to compel a man who changes employers to wipe
clean the slate of his memory.""- He is free to dispose of his
own personal skill, experience, intuition, wits, reputation-his
subjective qualities--even though these have been inspired, cre-
ated or enhanced through the opportunities, training and example
afforded by the old master. Against such competition, however
injurious or ethically crooked it may be, the employer is helpless.' 2
The recent English case of HeTpworth Mfg. Co. v. Ryott -3
furnishes an excellent example of this. Wernhamn Ryott was a
'Schavoir v. American Re-Bonded Leather Co., 104 Conn. 472, 133 At.
582 (1926); Aronson v. Orlov, 228 Mass. I, ii6 N. E. 951 (i917); Prince
Albert v. Strange, i M. & Gord. 25 (1849).
0 Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App. Div. 824, 133 N. Y. Supp. 910 (r9r2).
nPeerless Pattern Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App. Div. 715, 717, 132
N. Y. Supp. 37, 39 (ISM1).
-Herbert Morris, Ltd. v. Saxelby, £upra note 2, at 714.
'[1920] i Ch. i.
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good Kinema actor. His employer spent large sums advertising
him as Stewart Rome. After he had acquired a wide popularity
under that name, half of which was due to his own merits and
half to the merits of the employer's advertising, he broke his em-
ployment contract and engaged himself, as Stewart Rome, to a
competing company. It was held that the first employer was
not protected by the express covenant.
In an analogous case,"4 decided in Massachusetts, this rule
was similarly applied. Two young men, unskilled in service,
obtained employment with a dealer in cooking utensils. At his
expense, in his training school, they learned about salesmanship,
dietetics, hygienics, and home economics. Having thus acquired
a valuable knowledge of cooking-utensil salesmanship, for which
they gave no return, they broke their contract to continue in his
service, and entered the employ of a competitor. The employer-
educator was helpless; his contract proved worthless.
In each of the two last-mentioned cases there was a covenant,
supported by consideration which at least was substantial, and a
breach, causing loss to the convenantee. There was personal good
faith on the part of the covenantees, and, according to some,
defective ethics on the part of the covenantors. The employers
suffered a loss because the position in which they found them-
selves was not the result of violated confidence. The employees,
to their own advantage, had broken contracts but had not exposed
themselves to restraint or damages, because they had betrayed
no trust. Each prevailed because his covenant had put him in
the position adscriptus glebae, like the villein of medieval times,
and modem English and American law will enforce a contract
between a master and servant, limiting the ex-servant's indus-
trial activities, only when it is necessary to prevent a possible
betrayal of trust. In the earlier case of Peabody v. Norfolk,15
it was not clear whether the court was enforcing the implied duty
or the express contract.
Parsons raises the query whether the doctrine that an em-
ployee's express contract not to compete is void may not be a
" Club Aluminum Co. v. Young, x6o N. E. 804 (Mass. 1928).
298 Mass. 452 (1868).
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vestige of the obsolete guild and apprenticeship laws, under which
a man was doomed for life to one trade.' 6
What is such a betrayal of trust by an employee as establishes
a violation of a legal duty? The answer seems to be that it is
the betrayal of a trade or business secret.
There is no disputing the right of an employer, regardless
of covenant, to injunctive protection from a servant's taking or
using copies of his books, documents, plans, formulas, customers'
lists, or from his exploiting of the knowledge of secret unpatented
processes, formulas, or arts, uncopyrighted compilations, memo-
randa or collections of special information, which are the em-
ployer's own acquisitions, whether the servant acquired this data
legitimately or surreptitiouslyY-7 All of these are protected
properties. Equity distinctly recognizes business, trade, or pro-
prietary secrets as property, and a violation of such secrets as a
property injury; and equity limits the fiduciary obligation which
arises out of the relation of the master and servant to the duty
not to impart or exploit secrets.' Has the word "secrets," in
this connection, acquired a technical or equitable significance?
Is there an adequate definition of a trade secret? Some Amer-
ican courts have adopted the following definition as complete and
perfect:
"A trade secret is a plan or process, tool, mechanism,
or compound, known only to its owner and those of his em-
ployees to whom it is necessary to confide it. It is a prop-
erty right which equity, in the exercise of its power to pre-
vent a breach of trust, will protect. It differs from a
patent in that as soon as the secret is discovered, either by
an examination of the product or in any other honest way,
the discoverer has the full right to use it. A process com-
monly known in the trade is not a trade secret and will not
be protected by injunction. . . 9
PARsoNs, CONTRACTS (9th ed. 19o4) 9gi.
"'Peabody v. Norfolk, sunr note Is; Aronson v. Orlov, sapra note 9;
Yovatt v. Winyard, I Jac. & Walk. 394 (Eng. i82o) ; Tipping v. Clarke, 2 Hare
383 (Eng. 1843).
'See American Stay Co. v. Delaney, 211 Mass. 229, 233, 97 N. E. 911,
913 (1912).
.22 Cyc. 842; Cf. 32 C. J. 156. For an extensive review of the authorities,
see Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S. W. 834 (1925).
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The courts20 that adhere narrowly to this definition will not
enjoin the driver of an established route from competing for the
customers on that route, for his own'or a new employer's benefit.
They hold that an employee is entitled to the benefit of the friend-
ships that he is able to make through his employment, and that he
must not be relegated to new friendships, of which in turn he
would be deprived by a termination of his subsequent employment,
with the result that, after a series of such terminations, all the
world, or all his world, would be closed to him. These courts
also hold that the names of customers on a specific route or in a
given territory cannot be trade secrets, because a prospective em-
ployer might follow the driver or drummer over his route, take
down the names or locations of the persons with whom the em-
ployee dealt, and then hire him away from his present employer.
Customers who can be remembered are not trade secrets, though
written lists of customers may be. An insurance company's
agent, who sold policies to persons of his acquaintance, has been
permitted to persuade them to cancel their policies after his agency
terminated.2'
These authorities hold that the personal good will which the
salesman or driver acquires through his dealings with his em-
ployer's customers may be transferred to another employer, be-
cause this good will is a thing that cannot be taken from him.
It is part of his personality. Yet, strange as it may seem, these
courts indicate that, if the employee had made an express con-
tract to refrain from such competition, they would have enforced
it. In Fulton v. Grand Laundry Co.,22 it is said that very few
cases are to be found which bear directly on either side of the
proposition, and, in Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton,23 the
court said that it was following the main current of authority.
A number of courts and a strong body of opinion seem to
'Georgia, Kansas, Kentucky, .Maryland, and Minnesota.
' Stein v. National Life Ass'n, io5 Ga. 82r, 32 S. E. 615 (899) ; cf. Garst
v. Scott, 134 Kan. 676, 22 Pac. 277 (1923) ; Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton,
supra note x9; Fiiton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, r17 At]. 753
(x922); Boone v. Krieg, I56 Minn. 83, 194 N. W. 9z (1923).
= Supra note 21, at 361, 17 At!. at 754.
"Supra note ig, at 353, 270 S. W. at 836.
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be opposed to this construction of trade secrets, or confidential
information. There is an apparent inconsistency in denying re-
lief because the employer, though possessing property rights, has
no contract, and at the same time enforcing a contract not to
compete because it is reasonably necessary to protect the same
rights. The property right either exists or it does not. If it does,
it should be protected. If it does not, a covenant has no valid
basis, according to the historical theory. If it is not right to
restrain -a driver, who has gained the personal good will of his
employer's customers, from taking them to another employer,
because his popularity with them is part of himself, it would be
wrong to enforce a covenant not to capitalize that personality
for another employer. 24
The Kentucky court 25 might have mentioned states, other
than those it did mention,26 as constituting a minority which ap-
parently takes a wider view of confidential knowledge than that
limited to the narrow definition of trade secrets which it adopts
-Massachusetts, England, Washington, and the United States
Supreme Court, for example. Massachusetts agrees with Cali-
fornia and Illinois that if an employee takes a lease of the prem-
ises used by his employer he must hold it for the employer's
benefit, if, through his employment, he learned that it was val-
uable to the employer.2T Manifestly, however, an observing out-
sider could have deduced the fact of value, and such a secret does
not fall within the narrower definition.28 New York steadfastly
holds that a driver on a delivery route will be enjoined from using
his knowledge of, and influence with, his former employer's cus-
tomers on that route, for the benefit of a new employer. judge
Dickinson's "nice sense of honor" comes to mind when reading
'4 Reuter's Tel. Co. v. Byron, 43 L. J. Ch. 661 (1874), discussed by Keke-
wich, J., in Merryweather v. Moore, [1892] 2 Ch. 518.
Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, supra note ig.
California, Illinois, and New York.
TEssex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 214 Mass. 507, io2 N. E. 441 (913); Cf.
Gower v. Andrew, 59 Cal. 119 (i8ti); Davis v. Hamlin, io8 Ill. 39 (1883).
"Si~pra note ig.
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the New York decisions. 20 The employee, in the Light case,30
carried the customers' identities in his head. They were his
friends. Nevertheless the New York court held in effect that
their good will in trade was not his property but that of his em-
ployer, regardless of the fact that their names might have been
discovered by an outsider. An express contract was not neces-
sary to protect the employer's rights.31
In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Reichenbach,32 a secret process
was compounded by an employee who had adopted the direct sug-
gestion of an article published in a trade magazine. He left the
employer and undertook to use the process in a competing busi-
ness of his own. An injunction was issued. Semble, that a solici-
tor of trade, employed to increase the business, may not carry it
off when leaving.
The Massachusetts courts seem to have reasoned in a man-
ner similar to that of the courts of New York and California.
Thus, in a recent case it was said: "It must be recognized that in
employing any one as a driver and collector for a laundry the em-
ployer introduces the person to a public capable of furnishing
laundry business to which but for such introduction he might
never be known." 33
The United States Supreme Court also looks beyond the
mere word. Mr. Justice Holmes dropped an illuminating remark
in Dupont Powder Co. v. Masland,34 the same case in which
Judge Dickinson made the comment with which this article com-
mences:
People's, etc., Co. v. Light, 17z App. Div. 671, 157 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1916);
Witkop & Holmes Co. v. Boyce, 61 Misc. 126, 112 N. Y. Supp. 874 (9o8);
Witkop v. A. & P. Tea Co., 69 Misc. go, 124 N. Y. Supp. 956 (ig1o).
-Supra note 2g.
at Cf. Boylston Coal Co. v. Rautenbush, 237 Il1. App. S5o (1925); Conviser
v. Brownstone, 209 App. Div. 584, 2o5 N. Y. Supp. 82 (19z4).
=79 Hun 183, 29 N. Y. Supp. 1143 (1894).
B. & S. Laundry Co. v. O'Reilly, 253 Mass. 94, 98, 148 N. E. 373 (igz5);
cf. Cornish v. Dickey, 172 Cal. 120, 155 Pac. 629 (1916); New Method Laundry
Co. v. Macann, 174 Cal. 26, 16r Pac. 99o (1916); Davis v. Miller, io4 Wash.
444, 177 Pac. 323 (1I1).
U 244 U. S. 100, 102, 37 Sup. Ct. 575, 576 (1917).
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"The word property as applied to trade-marks and trade
secrets is an unanalyzed expression of certain secondary con-
sequences of the primary fact that the law makes some.
rudimentary requirements of good faith. . . . the start-
ing point . . . is not property or due process of law, but
that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the
plaintiffs...
The English courts are wary of employees' contracts, though
they protect the relation. Kekewich, J., in 1892, said that con-
fidence postulates an implied contract; that where the court is
satisfied of the existence of a confidential relation, then it at once
infers or implies the contract arising from that confidential rela-
tion; that the confidence is that the servant shall not use, except
for the purpose of service, the opportunities of gaining informa-
tion which that service gives him. 5
In the light of these cases, the question arises whether the
word "secret" does not mislead courts to adopt an inadequate
test? In Lamb v. Evans,"6 the advertising plates obtained from
the plaintiff's customers by the defendants (who were then the
plaintiff's agents), and used in newspaper advertisements, were
not secrets at all; anyone could have reproduced them. The en-
gines made by the plaintiff, in Merryweather v. Moore, 7 might
have been inspected after they had been sold, and their dimen-
sions obtained by any competent person. The process of making
the plaintiff's composition, in the Schavoir case,33 might have
been discovered by a chemical analysis. The essential question is:
Has there been an abuse of confidence? If there has been, it is
not necessary that the secret be a business secret.
It was said by Lord Chancellor Cottenham that Lord El-
don expressed the opinion, respecting an engraving of George
the Third, made during his illness, that, "If one of the late king's
physicians had kept a diary of what he heard and saw, this Court
would not, in the king's lifetime, have permitted him to print and
Merryweather v. Moore, [i8921 2 Ch. 518.
[1893] I Ch. 218.
= Supra note 35.
Supra. note 9.
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publish it." 3o Tuck v. Priester,40 involved the copying of pic-
tures, apparently in a public gallery, by a person in Germany,
employed for the purpose by the owner in England. The de-
fendant completed the plaintiff's order and then made copies for
himself, which he undertook to sell in England. He was en-
joined. In Caird v. Simne,4 ' lectures to a class were protected
from publication by one of the class.
It is not a requisite that the plaintiff and the defendant
should have had any prior relations. Queen Victoria and Prince
Albert indulged the fancy to practice etching. They gave their
etched plates to a printer at Windsor, for the purpose of printing
off some impressions for the Queen and Prince. The printer
employed a journeyman, who took away some of the impressions
and sold them, and by various mesne transfers they came to the
defendants who were proposing to publish them as etchings made
by the Queen and the Prince Consort. The defendants were en-
joined upon the motion of the Prince.
42
In the modem leading case of Dewes v. Fitch,43 and Fitch
V. Dewes 44 the employer was an English solicitor in good prac-
tice. He employed the defendant, first as junior clerk, then
as articled clerk, and, when the defendant was admitted to the
roll of solicitors, as managing clerk. After thirteen years in this
confidential service, the defendant, a capable practitioner, left and
set up in business for himself in an adjoining town. He was
thoroughly familiar with the affairs of many of his employer's
clients, with whom, through the employment, he had acquired an
intimate acquaintance. These clients preferred him. Lord Birk-
enhead said that the employer had the right to claim, for his
protection, that the business was his, and should continue to be
his, and that the defendant should not be in a position to use the
intimacies and the knowledge which he acquired in the course of
his employment in order to create a practice of his own and, by
*' Prince Albert v. Strange, supra note 9, at 46.
x1 g 0. B. D. 629 (1887).
, 12 A. C. 326 (z887).
'Prince Albert v. Strange, supra note 9.
9 [x2o] 2 Ch. 159.
[1921] 2 A. C. x58.
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so doing, undermine the business and connections of the plain-
tiff.45
The employer in the last-mentioned case was protected by
a covenant against competition, and this was enforced. Yet it
would seem that essentially the same relief would have been
granted him upon the implied obligation. These professional
secrets were not the employer's; they were his clients' secrets,
but a finding that the defendant's familiarity with their affairs
was a material factor in persuading them to transfer their busi-
ness to him, would or should have moved the court to issue a de-
cree against his dealing with any former client of the employer,
as soon as he threatened to do so. An express agreement not to
divulge the secrets of a business is not necessary, if such agree-
ment can fairly be implied from the circumstances of the case
and the relations of the parties.4 6 It is somewhat difficult to say
whether the court in the last case proceeded on the implied con-
tract or the confidence. Chancery always had an original and
independent jurisdiction to prevent what the court -considered
and treated as a wrong.
47
It would seem that if a contract cannot be implied, an ex-
press contract will not be enforced. And, while, according to
General Billposting Co. v. Atkinsol, 48 an express covenant will
not be enforced if it has been broken by the covenantee, it is sub-
mitted that the fundamental obligation of confidence should not
be destroyed by the employer's breach of an express collateral
or supplementary contractual obligation, but no cases have been
found on this last propbsition.
At any rate, the employer armed with a covenant is decidedly
better off than he would be without one. If an employee, in vio-
lation of his covenant, puts himself in a position where it is to
his interest to betray the confidence reposed in him, the employer
need not wait for, nor prove, an actual betrayal.'u
'Ibid. at 165.
"Stevens & Co. v. Stiles, 29 R. I. 39-, 7i At. 8o2 (igog).
Merriveather v. Moore, smpra note 35.
"[ipo0] A. C. I18.
"Walker Coal & Ice Co. v. Westerman, I6o N. E. 8or (Mass. 1928).
